http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-08-09/lehman-hsbc-may-be-sued-over-worthless-minibond-securities-judge-says.html

 

Fitch downgrades Malaysia. Don't forget these ratings agencies are the same ones, using the same methodology to assign AAA to those Lehman sub prime mini bonds......

 

Jesse Livermore had a similar experience some 70 years ago. This is how he described it:

‘I was at a dinner party one evening and was seated next to a man who had heard that I was in Wall Street. Ar one point in the conversation, he asked if I could tell him how one could make some quick money in stocks. Without answering the question, I asked what business he was in, and he said that he was a surgeon. I then asked if he could tell me how one could make some quick money in surgery.’

 

So the next time you attend some seminar asking you to sign up and be a professional trader on whatever exchange, make sure one is prepared for the possible benefits vis the RISKS.

Those who know don't talk, those who talk don't know

The title of this chapter is an old, respected truism in Wall Street. I first heard it from an  experienced stock trader over 50 years ago when I was a neophyte Merrill Lynch account executive. It has been part of my professional strategy since I first learned it, for it is one of the few significant maxims in an industry where irrelevant slogans and sayings abound.

It's too bad that not enough financial operators practise this strategy. It  could help traders and brokers in their speculative operations, especially in Asia, where so much of what passes for stock and commodity analysis depends largely on uninformed tips, rumours, stories and outright gossip. I would always put informed technical analysis over unconfirmed tips and stories.

I had an interesting experience recently, which exemplifies this point. The research director of a large Hong Kong investment firm showed me a price chart of some stock and asked for my opinion. ‘If you are a buyer or a seller of this stock,’ he asked me, ‘how far would you project the

stock to move?’ My reply was simple and direct. ‘I don't know.’

The gentleman was persistent and repeated the question. My reply was the same, but this time l answered in greater detail. ‘I don't think that anyone could give you a competent answer, merely  on the basis of a single price chart with no further information or technical studies.’ Then I proceeded to suggest what additional information and studies I would want to examine before even attempting to analyse the chart.

‘That's extremely interesting,’ he replied. ‘Do you know that I've shown the same chart to at least six other brokers and analysts, and every one of them gave me a definite answer with specific buy and sell points and even price objectives. And all of them combined would probably have less years of trading experience than you have.‘ All I could say was, ‘That's not surprising; it’s what 1 would have expected.’

Jesse Livermore had a similar experience some 70 years ago. This is how he described it:

‘I was at a dinner party one evening and was seated next to a man who had heard that I was in Wall Street. At one point in the conversation, he asked if I could tell him how one could make some quick money in stocks. Without answering the question, I asked what business he was in, and he said that he was a surgeon. I then asked if he could tell me how one could make some quick money in surgery.’

We are continuously forced to come to grips with the unique relationship between market news (stories, gossip and tips) versus actual market action. How many times has a company  announced some very bullish piece of news - an increase in the dividend, improved earnings or some acquisition — and the public goes charging in to buy the stock? Then, after a few days of  relative strength, the stock is in full retreat with all the recent buyers, having bought on the bullish news, sitting with big losses. How could that be? Wasn't the news very bullish? Perhaps the answer lies in the fact that the stock had already been going up for some time, with the ‘insiders,’ who knew about the impending announcement, having been big buyers of the stock before any bullish news was known. Then, the announcement was made and the public rushed in to buy. Who do you think supplied the stock for this (uninformed) buying? None other than the insiders, who were accumulating stock in advance of the news.

Stock buyers of IBM experienced this first hand, during the extended price decline from 1987 to 1993, when share prices declined from 175.00 to 40.00. At any number of times the stock was recommended by advisory services and brokerage firms, only to have it continue sliding relentlessly over a six year period.

The sugar market, too, provides an excellent glimpse at the unique relationship between market news and market action. The way the news is released after every move should be studied by thoughtful investors. During an extended bear market in sugar, culminating around the 2.50 level in mid 1985, the decline was accompanied by 



 
.

Figure 7.1 Long-term (monthly) stock chart of IBM, covering the period mid-1984 to mid—1994. Note the extended price decline from 175 to 40 over the six year period from 1987 to 1993. '

every type of bearish news imaginable. But after the market had finally reversed and was moving north, the bearish news items were put back in the desk drawer and suddenly the bullish items were trotted out for dissemination. On 26 January 1987, following a protracted 200-point

sugar rally (equal to a move of US$2,240 pet contract on just a US$800 margin),

The W/all Street journal noted the following:

‘Reports that the Soviet Union had been a large buyer of refined sugar in the world market helped futures to extend their advance . . . . Analysts said Moscow had bought 500,000 to 700,000 metric tons of raw sugar . . . and one analyst said the Soviets may buy as much as a million tons more. Analysts said prices were also buoyed by a report that Brazil will push back contracts to export 750,000 to 1,500,000 tons of raw sugar to 1988 or 1989 and by reports that Cuba is having problems harvesting and milling its cane sugar crop. In Brazil, diversion of sugar to alcohol production, stronger domestic consumption, and indications that drought may reduce the crop have created tight supplies, analysts said.’

The analysts seem to have ‘trotted out’ every bullish item they could think of after the market advanced. But you can be sure that, following the first big price decline, the ‘news’ would suddenly become totally bearish. One must wonder who these 'learned' analysts are who are always able to explain why a market made a move after the fact, but never seem to know, in advance, what to do.

And so it goes. The salient points to keep firmly in mind are firstly that market prices fluctuate and secondly that following every significant price move, analysts and commentators are to be heard offering perfectly plausible explanations for what just happened in the market. To many thoughtful observers, all this so-called news, floor gossip and rumour seems rather conveniently  contrived by some of the professional and institutional operators in order to confuse and confound as many gullible traders as possible into taking untenable, anti-trend market positions.

There ought to be a way to avoid being caught in this recurring trap, and there is. The astute operator will ignore the plethora of rumours, pit gossip and what generally passes for market  news, He will maintain his focus on the real technical factors underlying each market and on whatever disciplined strategy and risk control technique has worked best for him and for his  particular style of investing or trading. He will not lose sight of the old Wall Street axiom:

‘Those That Know Don't Tell; Those That Tell Don't Know.’

KLCI shows its true colours ends down, against the regional trend, as usual

Among the key regional markets:

Japan's Nikkei 225 staged a rebound and rose 1.53% to13,869.82;

Hong Kong's Hang Seng Index rose 0.48% to 21,953.96;

Shanghai's Composite Index rose 0.7% to 1,990.06;

Taiwan's Taiex rose 0.98% to 8,163.55

South Korea's Kospi rose 0.9% to 1,917.05 and

Singapore's Straits Times Index tose 0.26% to 3,245.45.

US light crude oil fell 60 cents to US$103.95 and Brent lost 14 cents to US$107.31.

Spot gold fell US$6.25 or 0.47% to 1,321.85.

 

Sona.... smooth ride...

"You always get lots of early bulls in a bull market, and lots of early bears in bear markets." J Livermore

Gambling on Sona, the SPAC new listing today...

Wall St. declines as investors focus on Fed policy meeting - Yahoo! Finance

http://finance.yahoo.com/news/futures-dip-key-data-fed-meeting-week-121127143.html;_ylt=AkDXsvbPOqtljNlYihMhmbiiuYdG;_ylu=X3oDMTNyaG90dGpsBG1pdANGUCBUb3AgU3RvcnkgTGVmdARwa2cDN2U5YjhhY2MtOGQ0ZC0zNjk0LTg2NDctMDIyMTU5ZTEwY2RhBHBvcwMyBHNlYwN0b3Bfc3RvcnkEdmVyAzUzYWM3NDkwLWY4OTYtMTFlMi05ZmQ3LTYyZGQ4NThhYWFlNA--;_ylg=X3oDMTFkcW51ZGliBGludGwDdXMEbGFuZwNlbi11cwRwc3RhaWQDBHBzdGNhdANob21lBHB0A3BtaA--;_ylv=3

It is not that easy. A couple of weeks ago, 'spread' trading was easy, not it ain't smooth sailing. This is a 4 har chart of Sep Oct 2013 FCPO spread. Not so easy now, for those who short this pair, and the traders who trade spread have big heads with 100s of lots...

The IPO should be cancelled or the successful applicants to be given opportunity to pull out. If I were applying for the IPO shares, I'd just pull out and give this company the flick.

 

http://www.btimes.com.my/Current_News/BTIMES/articles/20130726011219/Article/index_html

Why there is no such thing as a bad market

A letter that I received from a professional trader bears special significance, as it relates to the subject of this chapter.

‘We have been hearing quite a bit about the difficulty of trading current markets. No sooner does the trend "flip" on many of the technical and computer systems that traders use, and of course, the majority of speculators quickly take positions on the "new trend," than the market suddenly reverses again and goes racing the opposite way. It seems to be a recurring stream of bad markets, and it is happening with increasing regularity. What can the trader do about this?’

This happens to many traders, who become extremely perplexed, and who want to know how to handle these ‘bad' markets. It is unfortunate, but true, that when an investor makes money he attributes it to skill, superior acumen and clever timing. But when he loses money, he tends to rationalize it thus; the market was terrible, too volatile and excessively choppy. Speculators tend to overlook, or to deny, the real causes of losing trades.

It is difficult to admit to misjudgement of the market trend, the trade timing, the placement of stops or the tactical market approach.

Only by acknowledging such errors frankly can we discover where and how we erred and how to avoid such mistakes next time. The universal truth about futures markets is that, except for occasional and unusual brief time periods, the market and the price trends are not in themselves, good or bad, right or wrong. It is the trader himself who is good or bad, or more specifically, right or wrong.

This general commentary probably goes back to the beginning of commodity trading, as many as 50 centuries ago. Even in those ancient days, the winners probably called the markets ‘good,’ while the losers called them ‘bad.’ In fact, during choppy and apparently randomly moving trends, with unexpected reversals, and then reversals from reversals, it is more important than ever to  play a disciplined and objective game. We all get whipsawed from time to time, but it is important not to let such markets upset or unnerve you.

During much of 1993, 1 got whipped in a good-sized Nikkei futures position, despite my best resolutions to play 'by the rules,’  I had been short a line of March Nikkei futures, during the period April to September 1995, anticipating a break in the market. I should have noticed that the market was locked within a broad sideways trading range bounded by 20,000 and 21,500. After a few vain attempts to catch the trend I realized that there wasn‘t one, or to put it more accurately, that the trend was sideways and that I should have waited on the sidelines. In any event, by mid October, I was tired of watching the ‘red ink' all over my statements, and I opted to sit the Nikkei out from the safety of the sidelines. That was just before the market finally collapsed the last week of October 1993, and in very short order, declined from 20,000 top 16,000 - with me watching incredulously from the sidelines.

Yet, during such frustrating and difficult periods, there are always lots of clear thinking and disciplined operators whose accounts appreciate nicely, no small feat during periods of mostly sideways market and listless trends. One of the emotional problems that traders have to face, in terms of being right or wrong, is the subconscious reversal of two basic human emotions; hope and fear.

1. Trader A is long soybeans in the direction of the major (up) trend and is sitting with a good profit. He sells on the first reaction, fearing that if he continues to hold his long position the

market may reverse to down and he will lose his profit.

2. Trader B, on the other hand, is short soybeans against the major (up) trend, and is sitting with a small but growing loss. He will probably sit with the losing position, hoping that the market will reverse its major uptrend (it probably won't reverse, at least while he and others like him, remain short, and start moving south). In the meantime, the market continues its major uptrend and his loss continues to mount.

What we are experiencing are our principal emotions of hope and fear, but disoriented by 180 degrees. Trader A, with his profitable long position, should sit tight, hoping that the favourable moving market will continue advancing in his direction, adding to his profits. Trader B,

on the other hand, sitting with an unprofitable anti-trend position,

 

Figure 8.1 Daily chart of NIKKEI (CASH) traded on SIMEX. This illustrates trends in action, because we have a top through late October, a steep downtrend through late November and then a gradual recovery to an uptrend through late March 1994. should close out, fearing that the adverse trend will continue (as it usually does) and the loss will continue to increase (it too, usually does).

 

The trend of a market is a lot like the weather; it is what it is, and there's not much anyone can do to change it. Or, as Mark Twain once said: ‘Everybody talks about the weather, but no one does anything about it.’ So, if the weather looks like rain, you wear a raincoat or carry an umbrella, whether you like it or not. Similarly, if the trend of a market is down, you play it short, or aside; and if the trend is up, you play it long, or aside - because you can't change the basic trend direction of the market. You either go with the trend, or you suffer the probable losses in trying to buck the trend. There will be those instances when the market trend is down, your position is long, and somehow you end up making money. Or, the trend of the market is up, you go long, and you end up losing money.

Do those experiences contradict the oft-stated strategy, ‘go with the trend?’ Not at all. There are exceptions to every rule, and those types of trades, where you go against the trend and make profits, or you go with the trend and lose money, are merely exceptions to the rule. In like

manner, you may see a golfer reverse his usual grip ‘on the club and sink the putt, does that mean that this is the way to play golf? Not at all. It is just that it worked once, but if he were to try such a stunt over a period of time, the results would undoubtedly be otherwise.

It is only human to become discouraged when trading goes badly. Despite the best intentions and attempts at an objective and disciplined approach, most trades tum out losers. We all have moments like these, myself included. I have found that the best strategy for such periods is to close out all positions and stand aside from the market, for as long as it takes to get your head cleared and your attitude to become more positive. The market will be there, you can be sure,, when you return to action. I am reminded of a story told about Dickson W/atts, a famous old-time cotton trader from the 19th century. When asked for advice by a fellow-trader who claimed that the large size of his position kept him awake at night, Watts had the following to-the—point advice: ‘sell down to a sleeping level.’ It is still a sound advice.

 

Are these stocks trending? Insas, Brahims, Instaco, Maybulk...??

My friend alerted me to these as potential candidates for next week.

ACT Brumbies reaches Super Rugby Grand Final

http://www.foxsports.com.au/rugby/super-rugby/brumbies-advance-to-first-super-ru8gby-final-in-nine-years-after-upset-win-against-bulls-in-pretoria/story-e6frf4qu-1226686951060#.UfTyZaz7bCY

cpo 5 min, the bigger timeframe. The alaughterers got slaughtered. Export data nowadays is irrelevant, as palm oil plantations aprout out around the equatorial regions globally, so I wonder why traders still focus on 'cargo surveyor' redundant numbers...

fcpo on the 1 min.

 

With Soybean futures down >4% overnight, it was a case of getting the shorts 'aboard the pirate ship for the slaughter', for the moment at least...

5 closing record for FBMKLCI out of the last 6 trading days. A significant technical sign....

Buying pushes pbbank to all time closing record level. Heard there were some small 'foreign inflows' during the past week.

 

Was telling a fellow futures trader about this 'inflow', his first reaction that it was fake, just use Khazanah and EPF to remit money and bring it in n disguise as foreign inflows. This is the type of misled thinking that futures traders are prone to succumb to....

It's a sunset industry, at least in terms of high volume short term scalping. The traders are complaining of 'algos' screwing their trade.

Crude Oil

After a 1 day pause, fourth record closing level for the FBM KLCI.

Daily index futures, with the 5 and 10 exp mov avg.

What happens when traders, for some reason misjudge the trend or had a trading method (or lack of), loses money in the market?

 

Well, from my observations, they blame everything else but themselves, being not accountable to themselves. They blame the system for being slow, blame it on the government manipulating the prices of cpo, blame the algorithms for going against their trade direction etc.

 

One needs to stand up and be accountable to oneself....

The way to bet is on the favourite ala sports betting...

1 min fcpo, looks to be up?

An informative 'story' for traders by Stanley Kroll

On how "those who know don't tell, those who tell don't know"

The best way to introduce this important subject is with a story —

a true one.

My friend, Tony, who was one of the major floor brokers on the New York Mercantile Exchange, and I were sailing on the waters of Long Island Sound, New York. It was a hot, windless summer afternoon and we had been drifting along for half an hour, waiting for

the anticipated two o'clock southerly wind to pick up and send us scurrying down Long Island Sound for an exhilarating afternoon of sailing. Neither of us was an avid conversationalist and we had exhausted our normal topics, which is probably why we got involved in

the conversation I am about to relate.

Now, all my friends know my cardinal rule, that I never want to hear anyone’s market opinion, nor do I care to give my own. But here we were, all of a sudden, talking about the heating oil market. Actually we weren't talking; it was Tony talking and me listening.

‘I'll give you some very confidential information,’ he said, ‘but you must promise not to tell anyone.’ ‘Look,’ I replied, ‘I'm not interested in your tip, so please keep it to yourself.’ I thought that would

discourage him.

Wrong. It didn't take him more than a minute to recover from that mild rebuke, and he started again. ‘Be serious,’ he said. ‘I'll let you in on it, but don't tell anyone that I tipped you.‘

He was really determined, I thought; it must be something really special. And it sure was. 'Sheikh Yamani will shortly announce that the Saudis will double their oil production.’ A long pause ensued. ‘So what,’ was the best I could respond. But Tony was persistent. ‘So what?

ls that all you can say? Don't you realize the significance of this news? When the oil minister of the world’s leading oil producer is about to announce that he will be doubling production, the market is sure to drop by US$20.00, maybe even US$50.00 over night. There's a fortune to be made here, and I've just dropped it in your lap. Besides, all the big floor traders have gone heavily short.’

l have heard all I cared to hear. Besides, who wanted to have this nonsense ruin what would soon be a great afternoon of sailing? ‘Look,’ I retotted, ‘I don't know very much about the Saudis or their oil minister, or about oil production and its effect on heating oil prices.

And I certainly don't know, nor do I care, about the "big boys" and what they do, or don't do in the market.‘ (Actually, I had heard so many ‘big boys’ stories through the years, that I was totally immune to them.)

‘What I do know, though, is that this market is now heading sideways, but with a bullish bias, and in my opinion, it looks like it wants to break out on the upside and rum into a roaring bull market.

So, can we please talk about something else, now?’ Well I finally prevaied, although I had never seen this unflappable professional trader look so stunned. But my gambit rescued the day, and the balance of the aftenoon turned out just fine.

The afternoon’s conversation was very much on my mind that evening and, upon retuming home, I wasted no time setting out my charts and technical studies for a careful re-examination of the heating oil market. Perhaps there was something in this scenario that I had overlooked or misinterpreted, and a careful double-check seemed like a good idea under the circumstances.

It was mid-July 1985. and the heating oil market had been locked within a tight trading range, between 70.00 and 73.00, basis the February 1986 future. Although the majority of traders were heavily short, some of the objective computer systems had already signalled to cover shorts and go long on 10 july, and I was just waiting for a close of over 74.000 — and the strong market action ‘told me’ that this breakout was likely to be imminent — to tum me full bore onto the long side, with the expectation of a major upwards move in the offing. Let

the 'Big boys’ and their hapless followers exchange tips and gossip regarding Minister  Yamani’s anticipated announcement and its possible effect on the market. As far as I was concerned, I was anticipating a bull market, period!

Yamani either would, or would not, make the announcement; and even if he did, the bearish news was probably already been discounted in the market price. And the announcement, if there was to be one, would in my opinion, be the final ray of hope for the trapped bears

prior to their being massacred by the strong and rampaging bulls. In short, my technical studies ‘told me’ that we were, once again, about to see the classic ‘bear trap’ in action. Discretion being the better part of valour, I opted to sit out this bear tip from the safety and serenity of my long position in February heating oil.

This was fortunate for me because, following a few more weeks of sideways price action, during which time the ‘big boys’ and their followers had ample time to get further committed on the short side, the market on Friday 26 July closed strong, just below 74.00 for February. That did it! The trap had been sprung on the unfortunate bears, and following one last gasp brief price reaction, the market commenced an impressive rally that ultimately carried some 16.00

cents, equal to US$6,70O per contract (see Figure 4.1). "

What was even more amazing was the fact that Sheikh Yamani did, in fact, announce that he would be doubling oil production (Tony was at least right about that part of the tip) and predicted a sharp drop in price of the market, however, is the ultimate authority, and was not

impr with this bearish tip. In its frantic race towards higher levels, it barely stumbled over the oil minister's 'epic' announcement. This must have shocked the intrepid and greatly pained shorts who, in the end, lost tens of millions of dollars due to their blind acceptance of a

beau‘ tip in a bull market. There is a very clear-cut lesson to this story: beware of tipsters and

other financial gossips bearing free market information or well-intenrioned advice. And when the fundamental and the technical conclusions are at odds, you disregard sound, objective technical conclusions, or hang on to anti-trend market positions, at extreme peril.

At all times, it is necessary to focus on an objective analysis of market trends and high volume breakouts from existing trends. Successful operators have trained themselves to ignore, and admittedly that‘s not easy, the hysteria and sounds of alarm that accompany the plethora of

supposedly informed market pronouncements and tips.

Figure 4.1 February 1986 Heating Oil. During June and July 1985, the market was locked within a tight trading range between 70.00 and 730%. Despite major short positions on the part of many floor traders anticipating a bearish announcement from the Saudi oil minister, the

market broke out on the upside on July 26, commencing a major bull move to the 90.00 level. This resulted in losses of many millions of dollars to the big guys and their hapless followers, who had been caught in the classic bear trap that they had so often engineered in the past. Their mistake? Following a bear tip in a bull market.

 

Mickelson birdies last two to win Open

http://www.majorschampionships.com/open-championship/news/2013/07/21/mickelson-birdies-last-two-to-win-open.html

2013 British Open

Tiger Woods and Lee Westwood

-

3 min NQ

The same principle applies:

1 Identify 'your' major trend

2 Trade in that direction only

3 If wrong cut losses

4 If right stand up and take the accolades for any gains.

5 News or fundamentals are irrelevant

6 Expert analysis or opinions are even more redundant

7 Take the blame for any losses rather than blame others, most of all don't 'talk to the screen' or 'swear at the trading terminal' or 'blame the syndicate or algo' for any losses. Only amateurs do this.

Ambank, Tenaga

Why would one look to 'short' over the past few days?

lt is no trick at all to be right on the market. You always find lots of early bulls in bull markets and lots of early bears in bear markets.

And some traders are gazing into the future, predicting 'crash' to come... because of some fehg shui master.

Weekly chart 15 year....

If I had a dime for every time some market player, expert say "The market is crashing, aren't you afraid to hold on to stocks' But then holding onto a stock portfolio makes the 'track record' the best... Cannot resist this pot shot at the so called self proclaimed expert.

At one point the regionals took a dive, surely the fkli must dive too right? Trigger happy trading against the 5 min trend had consequences.

Larry Hite, the billion dollar fund manager, on trading being 'Zen-like':

To me, this is a very Zen-like business, and your most valuable tool is yourself. There is a Japanese book about sword fighting whose premise is this: when you get into a sword fight,

immediately assume that you're dead so you won't have to worry about being killed. Then, all you have to worry about is making the appropriate moves. Qnce you figure out the right action, assemble the means to implement it correctly and then proceed. That is what a good

trader does. He or she sets out a programme either through the use of a computer or through some other method to achieve a designated objective. In my case, I thought that  de-emotionalizing the markets was the right way to approach the idea of consistent returns. If that is not exciting enough for some people in the business, then so be it. I don': trade for excitement; I trade for profits.'

EUR v GBP

5 min fcpo chart.

This lunch time, somebody said "I think a viable target is 1800 for the cpo." from the current 2275 level that is a 475 point travel. These sort of ludrucous target price are designed to 'shock' because the risk parameters are 200 points, which no normal trader can withstand... The guy is an amateur....

"Analyse your markets and lay out your strategy and tactical moves in advance, and in privacy. Don't ask anyone's advice, and that includes' brokerage advisories, tips and even well-intentioned market gossip. And, don't offer your advice to anyone else. You shouldn't care if Shearson is buying ABC or if Salomon is selling XYZ. You should stick to your objective analysis and market projection based on whichever method or technique has proven viable for you; and you should revise that strategy only on the basis of pragmatic and objective technical evidence. Such evidence could be a signal from your chart analysis, your computer system or from the margin department, which reminds you that your position has moved adversely and that your account has become undermargined"